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Introduction: Philosophical Setting
In the keynote paper David Chalmers has defined “the hard problem” to be
the problem of integrating consciousness, per se, into our conception of nature.
“Consciousness”, per se, consists of experiences, such as an actual experience
of a pain, or of a sorrow, or of a redness. It includes a visual experience of a
table in a room as distinguished from an essentially theoretical construct, “the
table itself” that we conceive, or imagine, or believe to exist even when no one
is experiencing it.
John Searle (1992) in his recent book “The Rediscovery of the Mind” has
given a brief account of the recent history of an important movement in the
philosophy of mind, namely materialism, which tries to evade the problem of
consciousness by denying either the existence of consciousness, or its relevance
philosophy and science, or by trying to reduce consciousness to something else,
for example to “matter”—as matter is conceived of in classical mechanics—or
to some functional entity, such as the logical structure of a computer program.
Searle gives brief arguments, and cites more detailed ones, which seem to show
that all materialist approaches tried so far have failed, essentially because they
do not include an essentially irreducible component of reality, namely conscious-
ness, to which he ascribes a first-person or subjective mode of existence. This
mode of beingness he distinguishes from a third-person or objective mode of ex-
istence, which is the mode ascribed by classical mechanics to the particles and
fields that constitute the irreducible elements of that particular conceptualiza-
tion of the world.
To explain this notion of a third-person, or objective, mode of existence we
recall that classical mechanics was created to explain the motions of planets and
falling apples, etc. During early childhood each of us forms the theoretical idea
that certain things, such as his playthings, exist independently of their being ex-
perienced by himself or anyone else. Classical mechanics is predicated precisely
on the related notion that there are, similarly, tiny invisible objects (particles),
and also unseen wave-like structures (fields), that are similar to planets in that
they can be conceived to exist independently of anyone’s experiences. Thus an
object, such as a human brain, for example, is represented within this ideal-
ized conception of nature, classical mechanics, as being completely made up of
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these particles and fields that are supposed to exist independently of anyone’s
experience.
The likely inadequacy of this simple idealization is, of course, manifest from
the outset. An alert human brain is normally connected to someone’s experi-
ence. Thus there is no a´ priori reason to assume that we should be able to
adequately conceptualize this complex organ as merely a simple aggregation of
tiny localized entities that, like planets, can be imagined to exist independently
of anyone’s experience. Rather, one would naturally expect that certain proper-
ties of an actual brain might become lost, or impossible to comprehend, within
the framework of such an idealization.
Searle’s proposed solution of the problem of consciousness has three main
points:
Point 1
“Consciousness is just an ordinary biological feature of the world” (p. 85)
“The brain causes certain mental phenomena, such as conscious mental
states, and these are simply higher-level features of the brain.” (p. 14)
Point 2
“Conscious mental states and processes have a special feature not possessed
by other natural phenomena, namely subjectivity.” (p. 95)
“What more can we say about this subjective mode of existence? Well,
first it is essential to see that in consequence of its subjectiveity, the pain is not
equally accessible to any observer. Its existence, we might say, is an irreducibly
first-person ontology” (p. 95)
Point 3
“What I want to insist upon, ceaselessly, is that one can accept the obvi-
ous facts of physics—for example that the world is made up entirely of parti-
cles in fields of force—without in any way denying the obvious facts about our
existence—for example that we are all conscious and that our conscious states
have quite specific irreducible phenomenological properties.” (p. 28)
“One can be a thorough-going materialist and not in any way deny the
existence of (subjective, internal, intrinsic, and often conscious) mental states.”
(p. 54)
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Points 1 and 2 are plausible enough: consciousness could quite conceivably
be a natural property of the brain that is ‘higher-level’, in the sense that it is
left out of the classical idealization of the brain, and hence is not reducible to
the third-person ontology that characterizes classical mechanics.
Point 3 is also plausible, to the extent that one does not try to comprehend
the particles, fields, and matter of Searle’s thorough-going materialism as the
classical-mechanics idealizations of these things. For these idealizations have, by
virtue of the way in which they are conceived of and defined in classical mechan-
ics, a purely third-person beingness. The causal laws of classical mechanics can
cause these particles and fields, as they are conceptualized in classical mechanics,
to coalesce into all sorts of causally efficacious functional entities, but nothing
within those classical laws, as they are conceived of in classical mechanics, can
cause the emergence of some “new mode of beingness” that goes beyond the
beingness of aggregates of particles and fields. This is because classical mechan-
ics is a theory that was based, from the outset, on the idea that everything is
nothing more than an aggregations of things that have only third-person being-
ness: first-person beingness was explicitly excluded at the outset, and all causal
connections are explained within classical mechanics in terms of aggregates of
third-person things acting in concert. Since all functional entities constructed
in this way are causally reducible to third-person entities there is no rational
place in the theory for the re-introduction of first-person beingness.
The conclusion that ought to be drawn from Searle’s conclusion—which is
that there are two different modes of beingness, with first-person beingness not
reducible to third-person beingness, but constituting, nevertheless, a natural
feature of organs such as brains—is that the idealizations upon which classical
mechanics was based are not adequate to describe such organs: a new kind of
mechanics is needed; one that naturally ascribes two different modes of beingness
to such organs.
This conclusion drawn from Searle’s philosophic analysis might seem at first
to conflict with science. Indeed, the motivation of the materialists was evidently
to bring philosophy into accord with science, which in the nineteenth century
meant classical mechanics, with its monistic ontology. But we now know that
classical mechanics fails to describe correctly the properties of materials such
as, for example, the tissues of a human brain. Classical mechanics has been
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superceded by quantum mechanics, which is characterized, above all, by the fact
that it is dualistic: the single monistic ontology of classical mechanics is replaced
by an ontology consisting two very different kinds of beingness. One kind of
beingness is the kind enjoyed by the quantum mechanical analog of the “matter”
of classical mechanics. This part of nature, namely the deterministically evolving
wave function, is like the matter of classical mechanics in the sense that it is
represented as an aggregation of localized properties, and the temporal evolution
of each of these properties is determined exclusively by neighboring properties, in
accordance with equations of motion that are direct analogs of the corresponding
equations of classical mechanics. However, this in only half the of the quantum
story: there is necessarily a second component of the quantum ontology, one
that pertains to choices between alternative possible experiences.
Searle, when, confronted by the suggestion that quantum theory, with its
inherent dualistic ontology, is important to the resolution of the mind-brain
problem, says that he will wait until quantum theorists come into agreement
among themselves about the interpretation of the theory. But that misses the
point completely. All interpretations agree on the need for a dualistic ontology,
with one aspect being the quantum analog of matter, and the other aspect
pertaining to experiences. Thus the whole debate among quantum theorists is
essentially a debate about the mind-matter connection. This debate is precisely
where an input from philosophy of mind should enter. To wait until the quantum
debate is over is to miss the whole mind-matter ball game.
This point is important enough to elaborate upon, at least briefly. I shall
therefore describe here the five main approaches to quantum theory, focussing
on the dualistic and mind-versus-matter aspects of each.
The most orthodox of the interpretations of quantum theory is the Copen-
hagen interpretation, as expressed in the words of Niels Bohr. The key idea is
encapsulated in two quotations:
“In our description of nature the purpose is not to disclose the real essence
of phenomena but only to track down as far as possible relations between the
multifold aspect of our experience” [Bohr, 1934]
“Strictly speaking, the mathematical formalism of quantum theory and
electro-dynamics merely offers rules of calculation for the deduction of expecta-
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tions pertaining to observations obtained under well-defined conditions specified
by classical physical concepts.” [Bohr, 1958]
Bohr is emphasizing here that science, in the end, has to do with corre-
lations among our experiences: experiences are the ultimate data that science
must explain. Thus he can renounce the classical ideal of giving a mathematical
description of the objective world itself in favor of constructing a set of mathe-
matical rules that allow us to compute expectations pertaining to certain kinds
of experiences. Thus, in contrast to the the ideas of classical physics, human
experiences have an essential place in the theory. Yet the mathematical formu-
lation of the “rules of calculation” is based on a description of the “matter-like”
aspect mentioned above.
This approach is dualistic because the two things that it deals with are,
on the one hand, our experiences (of a certain special type, namely classically
describable perceptions) and, on the other hand, a set of mathematical rules that
allow us to compute expectations pertaining to these experiences, and these rules
are expressed in terms of a generalization of the mathematical structure that
occurred in classical mechanics, and that represented, in that idealization, the
“objective world of particles and fields”.
Bohr’s pragmatic approach was revolutionary in its day, and was firmly
opposed by most of the senior scientists of that time. In Einstein’s opinion:
“Physics is an attempt conceptually to grasp reality as it is thought inde-
pendently of its being observed” [Einstein, 1951, p.81]
and quantum theory, as formulated by Bohr,
“offers no useful point of departure for future developments” [Einstein, 1951,
p.87]
Bohr admitted, in fact, that his form of the theory would not work for bi-
ological systems. That, of course, was the origin of a logical gap between the
two parts of his orthodox formulation of the theory, i.e., between the subjec-
tive (experiential) part associated with our brains, and the objective (material)
part associated with the experiments that human scientists perform on atomic
systems.
Under the pressure of diverse goals (e.g., to expand the scope of the theory
to include biological and cosmological systems, or to firm up the logical foun-
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dations) a number of “ontological formulations” of quantum theory have been
created. They attempt to give a picture of the entire world itself, not just a set
of rules that allow us to form expectations about our future experiences.
The simplest ontology is that of David Bohm (1952). In the orthodox (Bohr)
theory one spoke of the complementary “particlelike” and “wavelike” aspects
of a quantum system. That was confusing because particles stay confined to
tiny regions while waves spread out: the two concepts contradict each other,
physically. This is what forced Bohr into his epistemological stance, and his
idea of “complementarity”.
For a world consisting of a single quantum entity Bohm’s model would have
both a particle and a wave: the particle rides like a surfer on the wave. One
easily sees how the puzzling double-slit experiment is explained by this model:
the wave goes through both slits and influences the motion of the particle, which
goes through just one slit. This model is dualistic in the sense of having both
a particle and a wave. But this dualism is basically a mind/matter dualism,
because the function of the “particle”, or more specifically its generalization to
the many-particle universe, is basically to specify what our experiences will be.
There is a huge gap in quantum theory between the information contained in
the “wave” and the information contained in our experience. The purpose of,
and need for, the particle, and its generalization to the many-particle universe,
is basically to supply the information—not contained in the wave (function)—
that specifies which one of the many mutually incompatible experiences allowed
by quantum theory the observer actually has. If there were no need to describe
the experiential aspects of reality, which are very different in character from
what the deterministically evolving wave (function) describes, there would be
no need for the “particle-part” of Bohm’s ontology. The critical assumption in
Bohm’s model is precisely the assumption that even though the “wave” (i.e.,
wave function of the universe) might describe a superposition of many different
brains of some one particular scientist, say Joe Smith, and although each these
different superposed “brains” would correspond to his perceiving a different
result of some experiment that he is performing, only one of these brains will
actually be illuminated by the light of consciousness, and this particular brain,
the one that possesses consciousness, is picked out by the “particle” aspect of
the theory, in a specified mechanical way.
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To explain how this (and also the other models) work, I shall often use
the term “branches of the wave function”. To visualize these branches, imagine
a large pond with an initially smooth surface (no waves). A source of waves
is placed at the center, but is surrounded by a barrier that has some gaps.
These gaps allow ripples to spread out only along certain beam-like regions,
with most of the surface of the pond remaining smooth. These well separated
beam-like regions of propagating ripples I call “branches”, or “branches of the
wave (function)”.
The surface of a pond is only two dimensional. But the quantum-mechanical
wave that corresponds to a universe consisting of N particles would be a wave
in a 3N -dimensional space. The “branches of the wave (function)” will typically
be relatively narrow beams of waves in this 3N -dimensional space, and each
beam will correspond, in a typical measurement situation, to some particular
“classically describable” result of the measurement. For example, one beam may
describe, at some late stage, a particle detector having detected a particle; and a
corresponding pointer having swung to the right to indicate that the detector has
detected the particle; and the eye and the low-level processing parts of the brain
responding to the light signal from the pointer in the swung-to-the-right position;
and the top-level neural activity that corresponds to the observer’s perceiving
the pointer in the swung-to-the-right position: the other branch would describe
the particle detector’s having failed to detect the particle; and the pointer
remaining in the center position; and the eye and low-level processing parts
of the brain responding to the light signals coming from the pointer in the
center position; and the top-level neural activity corresponding to the observer’s
perceiving the pointer in the center position. The fact that both branches of the
wave are present simultaneously is not surprizing once one recognizes that the
wave represents essentially only a probability for an experience to occur: there is,
in a typical measurement, a possibility for each of several possible experiential
results to occur, and the probability function (or wave function) will then have
a “branch” corresponding to each possibility.
Of course, the observer, Joe Smith, will see only one of the two possibilities:
he will see either the pointer swung-to-the-right or the or the pointer remaining
at the center position. To accommodate this empirical fact Bohm introduces his
“surfer” in the 3N -dimensional space. The surfer is merely a point in the 3N -
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dimensional space that move always in a direction defined by the shape of the
3N -dimensional wave at the place where this point is, and this rule of motion for
the surfer ensures that the surfer will end up in one branch or another, not in the
intervening “still” part of the 3N -dimensional space. Each branch corresponds
to one of the possible experiences. If the “surfer” (which is just the moving
point in the 3N -dimensional space) ends up in the branch that corresponds to
the experience “I see the pointer in the swung-right position” then, according
to Bohm’s theory, this perception of the pointer “swung-to-the-right” is the
experience that actually occurs: only the single branch in which the surfer ends
up will be “illuminated”; all others “remains dark”. Bohm’s rules for the motion
of the surfer ensure that if the various possible initial conditions for the surfer are
assigned appropriate “statistical weights” then the statistical predictions of his
theory about what observers will experiences will agree with the those given by
the orthodox (Bohr) rules. In this way Bohm’s deterministic model reproduces
the quantum statistical predictions about what our experiences will be.
The two parts of Bohm’s ontology, namely the wave in the 3N-dimensional
space and the ‘surfer’, can both be considered ‘material’, yet they are essentially
different because the waves describe all the possibilities for what our actual ex-
periences might be, and therefore has a beingness that is essentially “potential”,
whereas the trajectory of the surfer specifies the actual choice from among the
various alternative possibilities, and therefore has a beingness that represents
“actuality” rather than mere “potentiality”: the wave generates all the possible
experiences, whereas the trajectory defined by the surfer specifies which one of
these possible experiences actually occurs.
Bohm’s model is very useful, but as a model of reality it has several unattrac-
tive features. The first is the “empty branches”: once two branches separate
they generally move further and further apart in the 3N -dimensional space, and
hence if the “surfer” gets in one branch then all of the alternative ones be-
come completely irrelevant to the evolution of experience: the huge set of empty
branches continues to evolve for all of eternity, but has no effect upon anyone’s
experience.
A more parsimonious ontological theory, not having these superfluous empty
branches, was described by Heisenberg (1958). It also involves a reality consist-
ing of two kinds of things. His two kinds of things are “actual events”, and
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“objective tendencies for those events to occur”. The objective tendencies can
be taken to be represented by the wave on the 3N -dimensional pond, and the
actual events can be represented by sudden or abrupt changes in this wave. Each
such change “collapses the wave” to one of its branches. Thus Bohm’s “surfer”,
which specifies a choice between branches, is replaced by an “actual event”,
which also specifies a choice between branches. But whereas Bohm’s surfer has
no back-reaction on the wave, each of Heisenberg’s actual events obliterates
all branches but one. The big problem with Heisenberg’s theory is to find a
reasonable criterion for the occurrence of these actual events.
Wigner (1961) and von Neumann (1932), noting that there is nothing in the
purely material aspect of nature that singles out where the actual events occur,
suggest that these events should occur at the points where consciousness enters:
i.e., in conjunction with conscious events. This is the most parsimonious possi-
bility: all of the known valid predictions of quantum theory can be reproduced
by limiting the actual events to brain events that correspond to experiential
events. An argument based on survival of the species [Stapp, 1995a] provides
support for the idea that actual events occurring in human brains will tend to
occur at the brain-wide level of activity that corresponds to conscious events,
rather than at some microscopic (e.g., molecular, or individual-neuron) level.
This Wigner-von-Neumann version of Heisenberg’s theory will be discussed
presently in some detail. But first a few remarks about the final major interpre-
tation are needed.
In the Everett many-minds theory the basic quantum mechanical equation
of motion, the Schroedinger equation, holds uniformly: there are no sudden
collapses of the wave function; all branches continue to exist. Moreover, it is
assumed that, because all of the branches exist, all of the corresponding streams
of conscious must also occur.
Since the various branches propagate into different parts of the 3N dimen-
sional space they will evolve independently of each other: the physical “memory
banks”, associated with one branch will not effect the brain activities specified
by another branch. Hence each different branches can be considered to define
different “self”, or “psyche”, with each of these selves continually dividing into
different extentions of itself into the future.
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At first sight this idea seems to allow the whole theory to be reduced to just
one entity, the evolving wave, with the different psychological persons being just
“aspects” of corresponding brain activities on different branches. But that is
not correct. The branches of the wave function appear as parts of a conjunction
of branches: all branches on the ‘pond’ exist simultaneously, even though they
evolve independently. But the predictions of quantum theory are an essential
part of the theory, and these statistical predictions pertain to experiences that
are ‘this experience’ or ‘that experience’, not ‘this experience’ and ‘that expe-
rience’. To speak of probabilities one needs something with an or character:
something that can become associated with either this branch or that branch,
not both simultaneously. Just as the different branches of the wave on the pond
are conjunctively present and do not, by themselves, provide any ontological
basis for assigning different probabilities to these simultaneously present things,
so also is the quantum wave by itself insufficient for this task.
In Bohm’s theory this extra element of the theory was the ‘surfer’, which
determined the experiences of the observers; in Heisenberg’s theory the extra
things were the actual events, which also determined the experiences of the ob-
servers. In the Everett interpretation the only existing things besides the waves
are our experiences, and there is supposed to be a separate experience for with
each branch. Thus we end up again with a dualistic theory; with a world that
is composed of the one “material” universe represented by the wave function,
which evolves always according to the the Schroedinger equation, plus, for each
named person, an great profusion of many minds, or streams of consciousness:
the stream of consciousness of Joe Smith must be continually splitting into dif-
ferent separate branches, with at least one for each of the perceptibly different
results of any experiment that he performs. Consequently, the proponents of the
theory need to develop, in order to complete this interpretation, some coherent
dualistic ontology involving, for each of us, a profusion of branching minds, each
known only to itself.
In summary, all the major ontological interpretations of quantum theory
are dualistic, in the sense that they have one aspect or component that can
be naturally identified as the quantum analog of the matter of classical me-
chanics, and a second aspect that is associated with choices from among the
possible experiences. All interpretations are, in this sense, basically similar to
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the Wigner-von-Neumann interpretation to be explored here, but are less parsi-
monious, in that they involve either existing but unobserved branches (Bohm),
or existing but unobserved actual events (Heisenberg), or existing but unob-
served minds (Everett). (Parenthetically I note that the one great virtue of the
Everett interpretation, namely that requires no faster-than-light influences, will
probably evaporate when the theory is completed by the construction of the
needed consistent theory of the observing minds, for the theory will then run up
against the nonlocality theorems: See Mermin, 1994)
I now return to philosophy—from this digression pertaining to the dualistic
character of quantum theory—and comment briefly upon one of the principal
contemporary versions of materialism, namely ‘eliminative materialism’, as ex-
pounded in the recent book Neurophilosophy by P.S. Churchland (1986) . There
it is noted that there are familiar examples in the history of physics where a
theory dealing with one realm of phenomena, for example thermodynamics or
optics, has been reduced to a ‘more basic’ theory, for example statistical me-
chanics or electrodynamics. So why cannot psychology be likewise reduced to
brain physiology, and ultimately to the basic physics of matter? Searle answers
that in all of these familar reductions the psychological part of the problem was
“carved off” before the reduction was achieved, so the analogy is not apt: no
new kind of beingness has ever been obtained from the third-person beingness
of classical physics. Churchland avoids this ontological issue of the nature or
quality of the beingness by restricting the notion of reducibility to the causal
properties of the theories in question, thereby skirting the issue that Searle fo-
cusses upon. However, she must eventually face the issue in the form of the
problem of explaining the seemingly huge difference between, on the one hand,
things such as pains, desires, beliefs, and other experiential things, and, on the
other hand, material particles. She deals with this problem by suggesting that
the psychology of the future may be very different from the ‘folk psychology’ of
today: it may not contain such things as pains, perceptions, and other experien-
tial things. However, as Chalmers emphasizes in his keynote paper, that kind of
‘solution’ eliminates the very facts to be explained by psychological theory, and
in fact, as stressed by Bohr, by physical theory as well. As Searle maintains, an
adequate theory of the future ought to represent experiences as natural features
of biological organs, rather than explaining them away.
11
Achieving Searle’s desideratum requires no waiting for some unknown theory-
of-the-future, for quantum theory, combined with some rather standard ideas
from neuro-science, already presents us with an ideal psycho-physical frame-
work.
2. Quantum Model of the Mind/Brain
The main features of the mind/brain theory proposed in Stapp (1993) are
now briefly described.
1. Facilitation: The pattern of neurological activity associated with any
occurring conscious thought is “facilitated”, in the sense that the activation of
this pattern causes certain physical changes in the brain structure, and these
changes facilitate subsequent activations of this pattern.
2. Associative Recall: The facilitation of patterns mentioned above is such
that the excitation of a part of a facilitated pattern has a tendency to excite the
whole. Thus the sight of an ear tends to activate the pattern of brain activity
associated with a previously seen face of which this ear was a part.
3. Body-World Schema: The physical body of the person in its environ-
ment is represented within the brain by certain patterns of neural and other
brain activity. Each such pattern has components, which are sub-patterns that
represent various parts or aspects of the body and its environment, and these
components are normally patterns of brain activity that have been facilitated in
conjunction with earlier experiences.
4. Executive-Level Template for Action: A main task of the alert brain
at each moment is to construct a template for the impending action of the
organism. This template is formed from patterns of neural and brain activity
that, taken together, represent a coordinated plan of action for the organism.
This representation is implemented by the brain by means of an automatic
causal spreading of neural excitations from the executive level to the rest of the
nervous system. This subsequent activity of the nervous system causes both
motor responses and lower-level neural responses.
The executive-level templates are based on the body-world schema, in the
following sense. There are two kinds of templated actions: attentions and in-
tentions. Attentions up date the body-world schema: they bring the brain’s
representation of the body in its environment up to date. Intentions are for-
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mulated in terms of a projected (into the future) body-world schema: they are
expressed in terms of an image of how the body in its environment is intended
to be at a slightly future time. (Thus, for example, the tennis player imagines
how he will strike the ball, or where the ball he is about to hit will land in his
opponent’s court).
5. Beliefs and other Generalizations: The simple Body-World Schema, with
attentional and intentional templated actions, is the primitive level of brain
action: it gives the general format. However “beliefs” can be added to the
landscape. Also, each templated action has both intentional and attentional
aspects.
6. Quantum Theory: The features mentioned above are key elements of this
theory. But they are aspects that hold at the level corresponding to a particular
classically described ‘branch’. However, classical mechanics cannot account for
the properties of the materials (such as tissues and membranes) from which the
brain is made. Hence, within the basic theory, these classically describable as-
pects must be coherently imbedded in a correct quantum mechanical description
if one is to have an adequate account of the behavior of the brain.
7. Superposition of Templates: An analysis [Stapp, 1993, 1995b] of pro-
cesses occurring in synapses shows that if there were no quantum collapses occur-
ring in brains then a brain evolving according to the quantum laws must evolve,
in general, into a state that contains a superposition of different “branches”,
with each of these branches specifying the template for a different macroscopic
action: each of these different templates for action will evolve into a different
response of the nervous system, and consequently into a difference macroscopic
response of the organism.
8. The Reduction Postulate: Following theWigner-von-Neumann approach,
I postulate that the quantum collapse of the brain state occurs at the level of the
template for action: the (Heisenberg-picture) state (of the universe) undergoes
the collapse
Ψi → Ψi+1 = PiΨi,
where Pi is a projection operator that acts on appropriate macroscopic vari-
ables associated with the brain: it picks out and saves, or “actualizes”, one of
the alternative possible templates for action, and eradicates the others. Hence
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the organism will then proceed automatically to evolve in accordance with this
one particular plan of action, rather than evolving (a´ la Everett) into a super-
position of states corresponding to all of the different possible macroscopically
distinguishable courses of action that were formerly available to it. Thus the
“quantum event”, or “collapse of the wave function”, selects or chooses one of
the alternative possible coherent plans of action—previously generated by the
purely mechanical functioning of the brain—by actualizing the executive-level
pattern of brain activity that constitutes one of the alternative possible tem-
plates for action.
This collapse of the wave function is to be understood not as some anoma-
lous failure of the laws of nature, but rather as a natural consequence of the fact
that wave function does not represent actuality itself, but rather, in line with
the ideas of Heisenberg, the “objective tendencies” for the next actual event.
Each such event is represented, within the Hilbert space description, as a
sudden shift in the wave function, or state Ψi, to a new form that incorporates
the conditions or requirements imposed by the new actual event.
These collapse events in the Hilbert space are not things introduced willy-
nilly: they are needed to block what will otherwise automatically occur, namely
the evolution of the wave function to a form that directly contradicts collective
human experience: all of us who see the pointer agree that the pointer does not
both swing to the right and also remain motionless. Under the conditions of the
measurement it does one thing or the other, and all of us who witness what it
does, and are able communicate our findings to each other, agree about which
one of these two possible things actually occurs.
9. The Basic Postulate: Adhering to the Wigner-von-Neumann approach,
I postulate that this physical brain event, namely the collapse of the wave func-
tion to the branch that specifies one particular template for action, is the brain
correlate of a corresponding psychological or experiential event. Thus the psy-
chological experience of “intending to raise the arm” corresponds to the physical
event that actualizes the template for action that “tends to raise the arm”. The
pschological event of “intending to do x” is paired to the physical event that
“tends to do x.”
Attending is a special kind intending: the intention, in the case of attending,
14
is to up-date the body-world schema.
Different locutions can be used here. One can say that the brain event is
an image in the world of matter of the conscious event, or that the conscious
event is the image in the world of mind of the brain event, or that the conscious
event and brain event are two aspects of one and the same actual event. But the
essential point is that the quantum-mechanical description of nature in terms
of the deterministically evolving wave function is fundamentally incomplete:
some ontological element that is structurally different and distinct from the
local-deterministically evolving wave function, which represents the quantum
analog of matter, is needed to specify the choices between alternative possible
experiences. This added ontological element is logically needed in order to provide
a basis for the core property of quantum mechanics, namely its capacity to
predict probabilities for classically describable experiences to occur.
10. The Efficacy of Consciousness: In this model the choices associated
with conscious events are dynamically efficacious: each such event effects a
decision between different templates for action, and these different templates
for action lead to different distingushable responses of the organism.
11. Consciousness and Survival: It is often claimed that consciousness
comes into being because it aids survival. For this to be so consciousness must
be efficacious. Yet (just as in classical physics) consciousness is not efficacious in
the Bohm and Everett models: everything is completely pre-determined. Con-
sciousness would be nonefficacious also in the Heisenberg model if we did not
follow Wigner-von-Neumann in associating (at least some of) the actualizing
events with conscious events.
I am not assuming that all actual events are associated with physical events
in human brains: other events may also occur. The assumption, rather, is that
every conscious event is efficacious and hence corresponds to a physical event.
One must expect, in an organism whose physical structure is determined in large
measure by considerations related to survival of the species, that these physical
events will in fact occur primarily at the level of the actualizations of the top-
level templates for action, because this placement provides the optimal survival
advantage.[Stapp, 1995a, 1995b]
12. Conscious Events and Unconscious Processing: The general temporal
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development in the brain proceeds by periods of unconscious processing punc-
tuated by conscious events. A conscious event actualizes a template for action
that, by the automatic spreading of top-level neural activity to the rest of the
nervous system, controls motor action, the collection of new information (in-
cluding the monitoring of ongoing processes), and the formation of the next
template for action.
Classically only a single “next template” would be formed. This could be
achieved either by the formation of a resonant state that sucks energy from com-
peting possibilities, or by inhibitory signals, or by dropping into the well of an
attractor. But in any case the quantum uncertainties entail that the quantum
brain will necessarily evolve into a superposition of branches corresponding to
the different alternative possible classical templates for action. Next the quan-
tum event in the brain selects one of these templates for action, and then the
automatic (unconscious) neural processes proceed to carry out the instructions
encoded in the template. Thus we have an alternation between discrete con-
scious events—each of which decides between the alternative possible allowed
templates for action generated by the automatic action of the local deterministic
laws of quantum mecanics, and hence between the different associated macro-
scopic responses of the organism—and periods of unconscious activity controlled
by the local deterministic laws.
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3. Person and Self
According to William James:
“Such a discrete composition is what actually obtains in our perceptual
experience. We either perceive nothing, or something that is already there in
a sensible amount. This fact is what is known in psychology as the law of the
‘threshold’. Either your experience is of no content, of no change, or it is of a
perceptible amount of content or change. Your acquaintance with reality grows
literally by buds or drops of perception. Intellectually and on reflection you can
divide these into components, but as immediately given they come totally or
not at all.”[James, 1910, p. 1062]
“... however complex the object may be the thought of it is one undivided
state of consciousness.”[James, 1890, p. 276]
“The consciousness of Self involves a stream of thought, each part of which
as ‘I’ can (1) remember those that went before, and know the things they knew;
and (2) emphasize and care paramountly for certain ones among them as ‘me’,
and appropriate to these the rest... This me is an empirical aggregate of things
objectively known. The I that knows them cannot itself be an aggregate.
Neither for psychological purposes need it be considered to be an unchanging
metaphysical entity like the Soul, or a principle like the pure Ego, viewed as
“out of time”. It is a Thought, at each moment different from that of the last
moment, but appropriative of the latter, together with all that the latter called
its own ... thought is itself the thinker, and psychology need not look beyond...”
(James. 1890, p. 401)
In line with these ideas of James, and those of the preceding section, the
conception of a ‘person’ that emerges here is that of a sequence of discrete
psychological (i.e., experiential or conscious) events bound together by a matter-
like structure, namely the brain/body, which evolves in accordance with the local
deterministic laws of quantum mechanics. Each conscious event is a new entity
that rises from the ‘ashes’ of the old, which consists of the propensities for its
occurrence carried by the brain/body.
A felt sense of an enduring ‘self’ is experienced, and hence it must, within
this theory, be explained as an aspect of the structure of the individual discrete
conscious events. The explanation is this: each conscious event has a “fringe”
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that surrounds the central image, and provides the background in which the
central image is placed. The slowly changing fringe contains the consciousness
of the situation within which the immediate action is taking place; the historical
setting including purposes (e.g., getting some food to eat). The sense of feeling
of self is in this fringe. It is not an illusion, because the physical brain/body is
providing continuity and a reservoir of memories that can be called upon, even
though each thought is, according to this model, a separate entity. As explained
by James—see also Stapp (1993)—each thought, though itself a single entity,
has components that are sequentially ordered in a psychological time, and hence
each thought has within its own structure an aspect that corresponds to the flow
of physical time.
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4. Free-Will
Among the qualia that we experience is the feeling that we are, in some
sense, free. That is an accurate feeling. The whole organism is free to make high-
level choices. Its fate is not predetermined, and its actions are not controlled
by mechanical local deterministic laws in a way that would make that feeling of
freedom a complete illusion.
It might be objected that we are not free because, according to quantum
theory, our choices are determined by blind chance. That misses the point. In
the first place the choices are not blind. If the quantum events in the brain
occurred at the level of the neurons then the choices would be blind, for the
consequences of each individual choice would be screened from view by the
inscrutable outcomes of billions of similar independent random choices. But
the choices being made by the organism, acting as a unit, are choices between
plans for actions that have clear and distinctive consequences for the organism
as a whole, in terms of its future behavior. The choice is made at the level of
the organism as a whole, and the event has a distinctive ‘feel’ that accurately
portrays its consequences for the organism as a whole. The conditioning for this
event is an expression of the the values and goals of the whole organism, and the
choice is implemented by a unified action of the whole organism that is normally
meaningful in the life of the organism. And this meaning is felt as an essential
aspect of the act of choosing.
The final ‘random’ decision between the alternative possible distinctive ac-
tions of the organism is not some wild haphazard stab in the dark, unrelated
to the needs or goals of the organism. It is a choice that is governed essen-
tially by the number of ways in which the mechanistic aspect of the organism,
which has been honed to construct templates for action concordant with the
needs of the organism within its environment, can come up with that particular
template. Thus the choice is not like the throw of an unconditioned die. It is
a carefully crafted choice that tends to be the “optiminally reasonable” choice
under the conditions defined by the external inputs, and the needs and goals
of the organism. Each of the alternative possible templates for a coherent and
well-coordinated action of the organism emerges from the quantum soup, and is
given, by the quantum mechanism, a weighting that reflects the interests of the
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organism as a whole, within the context in which he finds himself. The choice is
conditioned by these personally molded weights, and therefore tends to be a de-
cision that is optimally reasonable from the point of view of the organism. This
arrangement avoids both the Scylla of a fate ordained and sealed at the birth
of the universe by a microscopically controlled blind mechanism, and also the
Charybdis of a haphazard wild chance that operates at a microscopic level, and
is therefore blind as regards likely consequences, and their evaluations from the
perspective of the organism. The intricate interplay of chance and determinism
instituted by quantum mechanics effectively frees the organism to pursue, in an
optimal way, its own goals based on its own values, which have themselves been
created, from a wealth of open possibilities, by its own earlier actions. Each
human being, though never in full control of the situation in which he finds
himself, does create both himself and his actions, through a process of a micro-
scopically controlled deterministic evolution punctuated by organic meaningful
choices that are top-down in the sense that each one is instituted by an actual-
ization event that selects as a unit, and feels as a unit, an entire top-level plan
of action.
[Within the contemporary framework of quantum theory that I am adhering
to here there remains, in the end, an element of ‘pure chance’ that selects one of
the templates for action ‘randomly’. Whether this occurrence of pure chance is
a permanent feature of basic physical theory, or merely a temporary excursion,
no one knows. In my own opinion this occurrence pure chance a reflection of
our state of ignorance regarding the true cause, which must in any case be
nonlocal, and hence both difficult to study and quite unlike the local causes
that science has dealt with up until now. In another place [Stapp, 1995b] I
have described in more detail the technicalities of the actualization process, and
also the possibility of replacing the element of pure chance by a nonlocal causal
process that makes the felt psychological subjective ‘I’, as it is represented within
the quantum-theoretic description, rather than pure chance, the source of the
decisions between one’s alternative possible courses of action.]
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5. Experience/Consciousness
The ‘Hard Problem’ is the problem of conscious experience: What is it?
Why is it present at all? Why is it so different from the other part of Nature,
namely the objective aspect of reality? Why is it personal, or subjective? Why
is it so fleeting, whereas matter is permanent and conserved? Can it be ‘reduced’
to matter? Can any purely physical account explain it? Is the material of which
the brain is made crucial, or is it only the functional aspect that is critical?
Why is it so closely connected to function? How do functional aspects become
ontological aspects, i.e. how does function become being? How can anything,
and in particular consciousness, be added to the already closed laws of physics?
Is experience a fundamental element of nature, or derivative, or emergent? What
are the bridging laws that connect mind to matter?
Chalmers asks these questions, and says that right now we have no candi-
date theory that answers these questions. But we do!
Chalmers suggests that perhaps there is a small loop-hole in quantum the-
ory that might provide an opening for consciousness. But there is not just a
small loop-hole: there is a gigantic lacuna, which consists of fully half of the
theory, and this hole provides an ideal home for consciousness. For quantum
dynamics consists not only of the mechanical process that is governed by the
Schroedinger equation, which controls the matter-like aspect of nature, but also
an entirely different ‘second process’, which constitutes a beingness of an en-
tirely different order. This second process fixes the actual experiential aspect
of nature, as contrasted to the potential aspect. It fixes what our experiences
actually will be. And in the most parsimonius of the available interpretations
it consists of actualizations of precisely the functional states that we “feel” are
being actualized by our intentional mood. This second process is, in comparison
to the ontological structures upon which classical mechanics was based, some-
thing completely new and different: it actualizes things that formerly were mere
potentialities, and hence has an ontological status that is different from the on-
tological status of matter in both classical mechanics and quantum mechanics.
It is a ‘doer’, and what it does is just what our thought do, or at least feel that
they do: it initiates physical and mental actions. As an initiator of body/brain
action it is indistinguishable from a stream of efficacious conscious thoughts.
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How does this theory answer the questions raised above about conscious-
ness?
What is consciousness? It is a sequence of actualizations of functional
patterns of brain activity. These functional patterns are expressed in terms of
a projected body-world schema, and each actualized pattern is ‘facilitated’ for
use in later executive events.
Why are these actualizations present at all? Because the laws of physics
demand it. Without such actualizations (or, in other interpretations, some sub-
stitute for them) quantum theory would be devoid of empirical significance, and
essentially incomplete. The actualizations are not epiphenomenal! They are ef-
ficacious, and hence can play an important role in the survival of the organism.
Why is consciousness so different from the other part of Nature, namely the
objective aspect of reality? The objective part of reality has a different kind of
beingness: it is mere ‘potentia’, whereas consciousness is a doer; it is a process
of actualization.
Why is consciousness subjective? It is an actualization that has many
components that are all integral parts of the whole. The totality contains the
fringe of the experience that constitutes the ‘I’, or ‘psyche’, that is felt as the
experiencing subject and actualizer. The experiencing subject is part of the
thought: if it were not part of the thought then there would be in the thought
no awareness of ‘I’ as the background relative to which the focus of the thought
is the foreground. So it not that the thought belongs to the ‘I’, but rather that
the ‘I’ belongs to the thought.
Why is the thought so fleeting, whereas matter is permanent and conserved?
Because a thought is event-like, whereas matter is the continuously evolving
potentia for an event to occur.
Can consciousness be ‘reduced’ to matter? “Matter” is mere potentia for
an event. But each conscious event is represented within matter (i.e., within
the wave) as the collapse of the wave (function) to a form that embodies the
actualized functional structure. The actualization cannot be expressed outside
of the matter that embodies it, yet, by virtue of its being an actualization, it is
not a mere potentia for such an actualization
Can any purely physical account explain it? If by a physical account one
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means a quantum mechanical account then the actualization is an integral part
of the physical account, and is thus explained by that account. But it cannot
be explained within the ontology of classical mechanics. For classical mechanics
has no events that are actualizations of potentia, and no concept of a potentia
that is a mere objective tendency for an actualization to occur.
Is the material of which the brain is made crucial, or is it only the func-
tional aspect that is critical? The material must support the quantum theoretic
generation of the possible templates, and the actualization of one of them. The
conscious process is a real process of quantum actualization, not a simulation of
that process in which this actualization does not actually occur.
Why is consciousness so closely connected to function? In the specific theory
described here this close connection arises because the conscious event is an
actualization of a template for action. The biological reason for this link of
actualization to function is undoubtedly the survival advantage it confers: a
species constructed so that the actualizations create functionally effective and
reinforced actions will fare better than one in which the created patterns lack
functional content.
How do functional aspects become ontological aspects? Actualizations en-
dow structures with beingness. Conscious actualizations in human brains endow
functional structures with material beingness: i.e., with the capacity to tend to
make certain later actualizations occur.
How can consciousness be added to the already closed laws of physics?
Nothing efficacious could be added if the laws were already complete! But the
quantum laws are grossly incomplete before consciousness, or some stand-in, is
added.
Is experience a fundamental element of nature, or is it derivative, or emer-
gent? An actualizing element that converts potentia to actuality is needed to
complete quantum theory. A coherent role for experience is also needed. Quan-
tum theory allows these two needs to be satisfied together.
What are the bridging laws that connect mind to matter? These laws have
been described here, and in more detail in my book.
6. Meeting Baars’s Criteria for Consciousness.
Baars (1995) has formulated a set of empirical constraints that any sensible
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theory of consciousness has to fit.
The first thing that the theory must account for is the fact that there is
a great deal of unconscious processing that is akin to consciousness, but is not
conscious. For example, there are below-threshold and masked stimulations that
seem to be being processed in ways akin to our conscious processing, but which
do not rise to consciousness.
As described in Stapp (1993), the key units in brain processing are patterns
of excitations that have been previously facilitated and are called “symbols”.
The task of the brain is to assemble some subset of these symbols into a coher-
ent pattern of brain activity that constitutes a coordinated template for action.
This template is expressed in a ‘body-world schema’, which is the brain’s rep-
resentation of the body-in-its-environment, or a natural generalization of this
schema.
In the process of forming the next template for action the input stimuli be-
gin to excite various symbols. But a great deal of automatic (i.e., unconscious)
processing occurs before there emerges from the welter of competing symbols a
single coherent combination of them that fits together into single coordinated
body-world schema. The symbols activated by weak stimuli, can influence this
competitive process of creating the next template, without these symbols be-
coming actually represented in the final template itself: they become squeezed
out by the requirement that the actualized template must form a single coherent
body-world schema. This picture of the general mode of operation of the uncon-
scious process of constructing the next template seems to provide an adequate
basis (though, of course, not the specific details) for understanding the effects
of weak or masked stimulations that Baars cites.
Perceptual processes are understood in the same way: the various symbols
that have been activated all feed into a (quantum) mechanical brain process
that must extract from this welter of symbols, each of which tends to excite
other symbols, a coordinated combination of them that fit together to form a
single coherent body-world schema, before any conscious event can occur. The
collection of inputs excite symbols that act as a set of clues from which a single
coherent schema must be formed. The fading from consciousness of stimuli that
call for no attentional or intentional action is accounted for by the fact that
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the conscious events correspond exactly to events that either up-date or project
the body-world schema, or some natural generalization of it. Symbols that lack
the energy, or the relevancy as defined by the whole active mass of competing
symbols, to be included in a current template for action will not be experienced.
Why are unaccessed interpretations of ambiguous interpretations not also
present in consciousness? The reason is that an up-dating takes the form of an
actualization of a coherent body-world schema. A coherent body-world schema
must have definite qualities assigned to various points in a spacetime grid; all
ambiguities must be resolved before the body-world schema comes into being..
One can surmise that a coherent body-world schema has the internal dynamical
self-consistency that allows it to persist long enough for facilitation to occur.
Why is processing slowed down when two alternative interpretations are
closely balanced in likehood? The reason is that the various stimuli excite the
associated symbols and these patterns tend to expand to fill out the body-world
schema. But if there are balanced tendencies coming from two incompatible
alternatives then the mechanical process requires more time in order resolve the
conflict and produce a single coherent body-world schema.
Another set of constraints mentioned by Baars are the contextual con-
straints on perceptions. Again, in the process of constructing the next template
for action all the stimuli tend to produce their corresponding symbols (patterns).
These various symbols all enter into the unconscious process of constructing a
template for action that fills the requirements of being a single coherent body-
world schema. Expectations, and the needs of the organism, are all represented
by input symbols, and this collection of symbols constitutes an initial set of
competing patterns that must be resolved by the brain’s automatic machinery.
This machinery must, if the organism is to act effectively, create an appropriate
template for a coordinated action that meets the pressures (i.e., tendencies) that
are represented in the various initially excited symbols.
Another category of questions raised by Baars concerns not percepts but
images, for example the visual images that we can bring to mid when our eyes
are closed.
Where is our image of yesterday’s breakfast before we bring it to mind?
Answer: In the patterns of activity that were facilitated yesterday at breakfast,
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and hence exist as symbols that can be activated by the excitation of some of
its components, but that are not currently excited.
Why after a brief exposure to a visual matrix can we access more infor-
mation than we can report? Answer: because the symbols associated with the
parts of the matrix are all present in our low-level brain response, but the pro-
cessing of this information that leads to an up-dating of the body-world schema
is conditioned by the “need” of the organism as defined by other input stimuli
and the “mental set” defined by the preceding conscious events, which issue the
instructions that are directing the construction of the next template. Only a
small part of the welter of input symbols makes it through the filter provided
by the symbols that represent the current contextual situation to become parts
of the next template for action.
I can go through the list given by Baars and show that all of his conditions
can be met, at this level of general principle—as distinguished from a description
of specific mechanisms at the neuronal level—by using the ideas used above.
More generally, this quantum picture of the mind/brain seems compatible, at this
level of general principle, with all of the mind/brain data that I have encountered
in my perusal of the literature. This perusal is not exhaustive, but I think
covers enough data to make it likely that the general ideas described here will
adequately comprehend, at this general level of description, what is now known.
Of course, working out a detailed neuronal machinery that will implement these
general notions is a huge problem. But in approaching that huge problem it
should be helpful to have a rational general conception of how things could
work in a theory of the mind/brain that encompasses in a coherent way the fact
that classical physics does not give a correct account of the behaviour of the
materials out of which brains are made.
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